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Article 2

JACKSON v. DACKMAN CO.: THE LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION
OF COMMON LAW TORT REMEDIES UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF
THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
DAN FRIEDMAN*
In Jackson v. Dackman Co.,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals created a
new test for evaluating the constitutionality of legislative modifications of
common law tort remedies: to satisfy Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, any substitute remedy must be “reasonable” to a majority of the
Court.2 While perhaps an admirably candid statement of what courts really
do in these cases, as stated, the Court of Appeals’ test provides no guidance
for future cases testing the constitutionality of statutory modifications of
common law tort remedies.3
In a recent article in the Maryland Law Review, I proposed a new methodology for the interpretation of provisions of state constitutions.4 This new
© 2018 Dan Friedman.
* Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Many thanks to my teaching partner, Professor
Richard C. Boldt of the University of Maryland School of Law, and our former students, Mollie
Rosenzweig and Anwar Graves, who helped me work out some of the ideas presented here. Thanks
also to Alison Best, Matthew Bradford, Jennifer Carson, David Maher, Julianne Montes de Oca,
and Aryeh Rabinowitz, my law clerks, and to Megan Gallo, who each provided excellent research
assistance. Of course, the discussion contained in this Article is not binding on me or my court, nor
is it a “public comment that relates to a proceeding pending or impending in any court and that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of that proceeding.” Md.
Rule 18-102.10.
1. 422 Md. 357, 30 A.3d 854 (2011).
2. Id. at 380, 30 A.3d at 867 (“The issue, under our Article 19 jurisprudence, generally is
whether the abolition of the common law remedy and substitution of a statutory remedy was reasonable.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 381, 30 A.3d at 868 (“[T]he substituted remedy . . . is
totally inadequate and unreasonable.”).
3. Discussing the analogous provision of the Oregon Constitution, then-Professor (and later
Judge) David Schuman observed:
[C]onstitutional interpretation . . . must be sensible, clear, precise, and consistent—and
more: it must also demonstrate fidelity to the constitution itself. . . . [A] court’s explanation of the meaning of a given constitutional provision should demonstrate some logical
connection to the words it purports to interpret, including their source, history, and position in the overall document. Further, “fidelity” requires that the court be sensitive to the
political culture of the constitutionally-defined community and reflect the community’s
most deeply held constitutive traditions. Finally, . . . constitutional interpretation should
be logical enough to avoid producing absurd outcomes, clear enough to guide ordinary
citizens, and precise enough to have some meaning beyond unfocused exhortation[s].
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1219–20 (1992) (footnote omitted).
4. Dan Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory to the Interpretation of State Constitutions: The Ban on Special Laws in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 411 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman,
Applying Federal Constitutional Theory].
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methodology was based on two premises. First, I argued that familiar theories used to interpret the federal constitution—textualism, originalism, structuralism, and the like—could be repurposed for the interpretation of state
constitutions.5 Second, I argued that none of these theories alone was sufficient to provide a one-size-fits-all, comprehensive interpretive tool.6 Rather,
it is my view that all of these tools, used together, can provide a careful judge
with the material to determine the best possible interpretation of a constitutional provision, by which I mean:
In my view, a judge must use his or her judgment to develop the
best possible interpretation of a constitutional provision that is constrained by a reasonable reading of the constitutional text and informed by the history of that provision’s adoption, subsequent judicial and scholarly interpretation in this and comparable
jurisdictions, core moral values, political philosophy, and state as
well as American traditions. A judge ought to make use of all possible tools to come to a proper interpretation.7
In that initial article, I used this methodology to enrich understanding of
the prohibition against special laws found in Article III, section 33 of the
Maryland Constitution.
Here, I use the same technique to inform my understanding of Article
19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights8 and to propose a better test than
the one adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 2011 in Jackson v.
Dackman Co. That provision, descended from the Magna Carta, has been
part of the Maryland Declaration of Rights continuously since 1776,9 but has
never received careful analysis from courts or commentators. Rather, the
5. I will not repeat the discussion of the development and methods of interpretive theory. The
interested reader should refer to my prior article and the work cited therein. Friedman, Applying
Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 412–17, 427–66. Or, as the insufferable Gilderoy
Lockhart would say, “for full details, see my published works.”
6. Nor will I repeat my criticism of foundationalism, by which adherents of a particular theory
of interpretation, most often textualism or originalism, claim that these theories can provide answers
to every interpretive question arising under a constitution, thereby reducing the need for judicial
judgment. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 412–17, 444.
7. Id. at 467 (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 3.
8. Article 19 provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have
remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the Land.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 19.
9. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 17 (1976); Dan Friedman, The History, Development,
and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 658, 694 nn.304–
13 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights]; Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights of
Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Tracing
the Lineage].
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Court of Appeals historically treated Article 19 as if it was redundant to Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, and treated both as if they were synonymous with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.10 Since 1985, however, the Court of Appeals has
applied Article 19 in three contexts: (1) Guaranteeing “a right to a remedy
both in circumstances in which the legislature has failed to provide such a
remedy and in circumstances in which the legislature unreasonably seeks to
limit an existing remedy.”11 These claims arise in a variety of situations,
including new or expanded immunities, damage caps, statutes of limitation
and repose, and alternative compensation systems; (2) Ensuring “that rights
belonging to Marylanders are ‘not illegally or arbitrarily denied by the government’”;12 and (3) More literally, to ensure that courtrooms are open to litigants and the public.13
Jackson v. Dackman Co. concerned the first context: whether the legislature’s modification of the remedy for the victims of lead paint poisoning
had the effect of denying victims a remedy.14
I. JACKSON V. DACKMAN CO.
A. The Court’s Opinion
In 2002, Zi’Tashia Jackson and her mother, Tameka, sued the Dackman
Company in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that Zi’Tashia had
suffered severe and permanent brain damage from ingesting lead paint at two
properties owned by the defendant.15 Among other arguments, the plaintiffs
alleged that the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act of 1994,16 which
created an alternative compensation system for victims of lead paint poisoning, was unconstitutional under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.17 The trial court found the law constitutional and granted summary

10. See infra note 52.
11. DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION 46 (Oxford University Press ed.
2011) (2006) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION] (Piselli v. 75th St. Med.,
371 Md. 188, 205, 808 A.2d 508, 518 (2002); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 105, 660 A.2d 447,
464 (1992)).
12. Id. at 46–47 (citing Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 366, 601 A.2d 102, 113 (1992)).
13. Id. at 47–48 (citing Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass’n, 366 Md. 597, 626–27, 785 A.2d 361,
378 (2001)).
14. In this Article, I characterize the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act of 1994 (at issue
in Jackson) as an alternative compensation system, providing an immunity from suit in exchange
for a reduced but certain no-fault award like, for example, the workers’ compensation system. My
characterization is in contrast to the Court of Appeals in Jackson, which made the rhetorical but not
completely accurate choice to describe the Act as only providing immunity. See infra notes 23, 32.
15. Jackson v. Dackman Co., 422 Md. 357, 370, 30 A.3d 54, 861–62 (2011).
16. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 6-835–6-836 (LexisNexis 2013).
17. Jackson, 422 Md. at 375, 30 A.3d at 863.
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judgment for the defendant.18 On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals agreed
as to the constitutionality of the Act but reversed on other grounds.19
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality
of the Act.20 The Court reviewed the terms of the Act, which by its analysis
offered the owner of an affected property immunity from personal injury lawsuits after making a qualified offer to a person at risk.21 This immunity remained, notwithstanding acceptance or rejection of the qualified offer.22
Moreover, the owners were immune from lawsuits brought on behalf of persons at risk, regardless of whether such a qualified offer was made. Essentially, the persons at risk had no cause of action in the event that no qualified
offer was made.23 In this case, the defendants made no qualified offer to the
plaintiffs, thereby leaving the plaintiffs with no cause of action to recover for
damages.24
Notwithstanding the owner’s immunity, the statute placed a cap on the
amount of the qualified offer.25 The maximum amount payable is $17,000.26
This amount consists of $7500 for medical treatment and $9500 for relocation benefits, including relocation expenses, a rent subsidy, and incidental
expenses.27 The Court of Appeals noted that “most of this [sum] is payable
to the provider of medical or other services and not to the person at risk.”28
Critically, the Court held:
For a child who is found to be permanently brain damaged from
ingesting lead paint, proximately caused by the landlord’s negligence, the maximum amount of compensation under a qualified
offer is minuscule. It is almost no compensation. Thus, the remedy
which the Act substitutes for a traditional personal injury action
results in either no compensation (where no qualified offer is made
or where a qualified offer is rejected) or drastically inadequate
compensation (where such qualified offer is made and accepted).29

18. Id. at 374, 30 A.3d at 864.
19. Id. at 374–75, 30 A.3d at 864. The intermediate appellate court held that the landlord had
failed to comply with registration requirements. Id.
20. Id. at 375, 30 A.3d at 865.
21. ENVIR. §§ 6-835 and 6-836.
22. Id. This reflects some confusion about the Act. In practice, a claimant’s acceptance of a
qualified offer reduced the landlord’s liability to the amount of the qualified offer, as the Court
seems to acknowledge in footnote 8. Jackson, 422 Md. at 369 n.8, 30 A.3d at 861 n.8.
23. Jackson, 422 Md. at 381, 30 A.3d at 868.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (describing ENVIR. § 6-840).
27. Id. (describing ENVIR. § 6-840(a)(1)–(2)).
28. Id. at 366, 30 A.3d at 859 (referencing ENVIR. § 6-840(b), which requires all payments to
be paid to service providers, excluding incidental expenses as required by Section 6-840(a)(2)(iii)).
29. Id. at 382, 30 A.3d at 868.
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The Court determined that a qualified offer, which is the sole statutory
remedy “for a permanently brain damaged child[,] is totally inadequate and
unreasonable.”30 As a result, the Court declared the immunity provisions of
the Act invalid under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.31
B. Criticism of the Opinion in Jackson v. Dackman Co.
The unanimous opinion for the Court of Appeals is not up to the Court’s
usual standards of depth, analysis, and reasoning. For example, there was
very little discussion of the constitutional provision on which it relies—Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. There was no textual analysis
of Article 19. There was no historical analysis that would explain the history
of Article 19 and how it came to be a part of Maryland’s constitutional pantheon. There was no acknowledgement of the sensitive separation of powers
issues that arise when the judiciary considers the constitutionality of legislation to modify a common law remedy. There was no consideration of sister
state remedy clause jurisprudence. More concretely, there was also no consideration of why the legislature adopted the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act of 1994.32 There was no acknowledgement that the statute had been

30. Id. at 381, 30 A.3d at 868.
31. The Court held the immunity provisions (ENVIR. §§ 6-828, 6-835, 6-836, 6-836.1) unconstitutional, but severable, from the remainder of the Act. Jackson, 422 Md. at 383, 30 A.3d at 869.
The Office of the Attorney General issued an opinion on December 4, 2017, regarding the Jackson
v. Dackman Co. decision. MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 102 OP ATT’Y GEN. 16,
SEVERABILITY–LEAD POISONING PREVENTION–”QUALIFIED OFFER” PROVISIONS OF REDUCTION
OF LEAD RISK IN HOUSING ACT ARE NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE IMMUNITY PROVISIONS
INVALIDATED IN JACKSON V. DACKMAN (2017). Contrary to the Court’s holding in Jackson, the
Attorney General concluded that “the qualified offer provisions are so intertwined with the immunity provisions that the General Assembly would not have intended them to operate apart from one
another.” Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Attorney General, “the qualified offer
provisions did not survive the decision in Dackman.” Id.
32. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the views of the Attorney General (who might have
provided useful context) were not sought in Jackson. This is a recurrent problem that should be
avoidable by reference to two strands of law, which together make it mandatory to seek the views
of the Attorney General when an appellate court is considering the constitutionality of a state law.
First, the Maryland Constitution requires the clerks of the appellate courts to notify the Attorney
General of any case brought “in which the State . . . has [an] interest.” MD. CONST. art. V, § 6; see
also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-405(c) (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring notice to the
Attorney General of any declaratory judgment action seeking to declare a statute unconstitutional).
Second, the Court of Appeals in State v. Burning Tree Club made plain that it is the duty of the
Attorney General to defend the constitutionality of statutes: “A statute, with its presumption of constitutionality, has [the] right to an advocate of its validity.” 301 Md. 9, 36–37, 481 A.2d 785, 799
(1984) (holding “the Attorney General ordinarily has the duty of appearing in the courts as the
defender of the validity of enactments of the General Assembly”). With no advocate of its own in
Jackson, it was easier for the Court to find the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act of 1994
unconstitutional.
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in place for seventeen years and that people had made economic decisions
based on the Act’s existence.33
The only analysis in which the Court engaged was a review of its prior
precedents under Article 19—and not a very convincing review at that. The
Court cited distinguishable cases,34 and more importantly, without acknowledging that it was doing so, changed its test for evaluating Article 19 challenges from one that gave a great deal of deference to the legislature to one
that gives no deference at all.35 The Jackson Court held that “[t]he issue,
under our Article 19 jurisprudence, generally is whether the abolition of the
common law remedy and substitution of a statutory remedy was reasonable.”36 Concluding that it believed the provisions of the Act giving tort immunity to landlords in exchange for minimal compensation to victims were
unreasonable, the Court invalidated the statute.37
The explanation of the Jackson Court’s transformation of the standard
for reviewing challenges brought under Article 19 requires a little history.
33. While the statute was in place, landlords who had made the necessary repairs purchased
homeowners’ insurance policies with lead paint exclusions designed to match the maximum exposure of a qualified offer. MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 19-704(d) (LexisNexis 2017); see also MD. INS.
ADMIN., REPORT OF THE WORKGROUP ON LEAD LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR OWNERS OF PRE1978 RENTAL PROPERTY MSAR NO. 9267, at 5–6 (2012).
34. In summing up its review of its Article 19 precedents, the Court quoted Robinson v. Bunch,
stating, “The Legislature may ordinarily substitute a statutory remedy . . . for a common law remedy
without violating Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights.” Jackson, 422 Md. at 381, 30 A.3d at 868
(quoting Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 446–47, 788 A.2d 636, 645 (2002)). From there, the
Court concluded that challenges under Article 19 are to be analyzed under a reasonableness standard. Id. at 380, 30 A.3d at 867. The jump by the Jackson Court from Robinson to the announcement
of this standard, however, was not adequately supported. In Robinson, the only support offered by
the Court for its proposition was a string citation of cases—most of which addressed unrelated issues. For instance, the Court cited to Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 104–08, 660 A.2d 447, 464–
66 (1995); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 374 n.14, 597 A.2d 432, 446 n.14 (1991); and Johnson
v. Maryland St. Police, 331 Md. 285, 297 n.8, 628 A.2d 162, 168 n.8 (1993) all of which primarily
addressed the permissible scope of state governmental immunity for violations of constitutional
rights. Md. Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 337 Md. 658, 675–82, 655 A.2d 886, 895–98 (1995), concerned whether administrative agencies can perform judicial functions without violating the separation of powers under Article 8. Finally, Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696,
697 (1929), and Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710, 715 (1917), did not deal
with the availability of a tort remedy under Article 19, but rather whether the Workers’ Compensation Act must provide a right to a jury under Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Although each case discussed Article 19—at least cursorily—at some point, altogether, the cases offered little support for the Court’s assertion in Robinson. Notably, the only support offered by the
Jackson Court in its summary of Article 19 precedent is the identical string citation to that used in
Robinson, which is equally unavailing here. Rather than adopting the same string citation from
Robinson, I believe the Court could have better supported its conclusion that challenges under Article 19 are analyzed using a reasonableness standard by citing directly to the several Maryland
cases that speak to that point. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 365, 601 A.2d 102, 113
(1992); Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., 370 Md. 604, 644, 805 A.2d 1061, 1084–85 (2002); Rios v.
Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 137, 872 A.2d 1, 20 (2005).
35. See infra notes 44–47.
36. Jackson, 422 Md. at 380, 30 A.3d at 867.
37. Id.
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Early cases, if they dealt with Article 19 at all, ignored its focus on remedies
and treated Article 19 as if it was simply redundant with Article 24 and with
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process.38 As a
result, during this period, if the courts evaluated legislation under Article 19
at all, they imported the deferential rational basis review that applies in due
process cases.39 Things changed in a series of cases decided beginning in
1985.40 In these cases, the Court of Appeals took a closer look at Article 19,
stopped treating it as a due process provision, and began to treat it as an independent remedy provision.41 Nevertheless, the Court decided to continue
to apply a rational basis review or, as it sometimes characterized it, a test of
38. See, e.g., In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187, 133 A.2d 441, 447 (1957) (reaffirming that “the
phrase ‘the Law of the Land’ in Article [24] of the Declaration of Rights mean[s] the same as ‘due
process of law’ in the Federal Constitution” and holding that “the words ‘the Law of the Land’ in
Article 19 have a like meaning.”); see also A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE:
MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 299 (1968) (“What the Great Charter [i.e.,
Magna Carta] called ‘law of the land’ we would call ‘due process of law’—with excellent historical
sanction.”). I also count Attorney General v. Johnson, a 1978 case upholding the constitutionality
of a statutory scheme requiring medical malpractice claims to be arbitrated prior to suit, in this group
of cases that treat Articles 19 and 24 interchangeably. 282 Md. 274, 298, 385 A.2d 57, 71 (1978),
rev’d on other grounds, Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d, 1152 (1991). In Johnson, the
Court held that “we simply cannot conclude that the additional expense and delay mandated by this
malpractice claims statute is so unreasonable in relation to its legitimate goal that it contravenes due
process.” Id. at 299, 385 A.2d at 71 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, I have written about the historical relationship between Articles 19 and 24 of the Declaration of Rights, both of which were clearly
derived from the same source: the Magna Carta of 1225. Though Maryland lawyers and judges
have generally treated the two provisions as identical—both to each other, and to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of due process—to read these “two provisions as
redundant . . . violates the canon of constitutional interpretation that requires that each word of a
constitution be given meaning.” Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 1001 n.330. Today, however, it is clear that the courts use these two provisions for different purposes. Compare
FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 45–48, with id. at 56–61. See also
JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND
DEFENSES 6-5 (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2015) (stating “[a]lthough due course and due process clauses
are often misread as equivalents . . . they are not the same”).
39. Under Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence, “rational basis” review, with
considerable deference to the judgment of the legislature, is required when a statute does not affect
a suspect class and does not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right. City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights
or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions . . . our decisions presume the constitutionality of
the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.”).
40. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992); Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689,
501 A.2d 27 (1985); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 499 A.2d 178
(1985).
41. Hill, 304 Md. at 703–04, 501 A.2d at 34–35 (discussing Article 19 as a constitutional provision protecting the right of access to the courts under which a tort claim can be brought); Coupard,
304 Md. at 360, 499 A.2d at 189 (recognizing that a litigant can assert a claim for relief under Article
19 if the right of access to the courts has been denied); Murphy, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113
(noting that tort plaintiffs can bring claims under Article 19 specifically and that if a restriction
implicates Article 19, it might be “subject to heightened scrutiny for purposes of equal protection
analysis under Article 24.”); see also FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12,
at 45–48.
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“reasonableness.”42 In 1992, for example, the Court of Appeals decided Murphy v. Edmonds, in which it adopted the classic formulation of the test that it
would apply in Article 19 cases: “Article 19 does guarantee access to the
courts, but that access is subject to reasonable regulation. A statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is
unreasonable.”43 The obvious hallmark of this Murphy formulation is its deference to the legislature and, in practice, during this period the Court did not
invalidate a legislative enactment using Article 19.
Ten years later, however, the Court of Appeals began to modify the
Murphy formulation by replacing the word “only” with an ellipsis.44 In retrospect, the change—and its potential effect on the standard for reviewing
42. For example, in Murphy, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statutory
cap on noneconomic tort damages as a reasonable restriction under Article 19 after applying a “rational basis” test. 325 Md. at 367 n.9, 601 A.2d at 114 n.9 (citing Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
704 F. Supp. 1325, 1338 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages is
constitutional and survived “rational basis” review under Article 19). In Hill, the Court used “rational basis” scrutiny under Article 19 to uphold a statute of limitations on medical malpractice
claims, stating that “[l]aws [that] do not make distinctions based on suspect classifications or significantly interfere with a fundamental right are presumed constitutional and they will only be struck
down if the party challenging them proves they have no rational basis.” 304 Md. at 703, 501 A.2d
at 34. Finally, in Coupard, the Court applied “rational basis” scrutiny under Article 19 to a statute
of repose for claims for defects in improvements to land by examining “the reasonableness of the
purpose of the statute and the reasonableness of the relationship of the restriction to that purpose.”
304 Md. at 360, 499 A.2d at 189. Sometimes, the Court of Appeals described the same test as a
“reasonableness” standard and asked whether the legislative modification was reasonable in relation
to the goals of the legislature. Whether the Court called it “rational basis” review or simply a “reasonableness” test, the result was a standard that gave great deference to the judgment of the General
Assembly.
43. 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113 (emphasis added).
44. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 644, 805 A.2d 1061, 1084–85 (2002)
(“A statutory restriction upon access to the courts [in such cases] violates Article 19 . . . if the restriction is unreasonable” (quoting Murphy, 325 Md. at 365, 601 A.2d at 113)). Written, notably,
by the same author as Dua and Jackson, Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188, 215, 808 A.2d
508, 523–24 (2002), and Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 264, 863 A.2d 297, 309–10 (2004), followed
Dua, and while purporting to follow the old rational basis test, modified the Murphy quote in the
same way Dua had. Rios v. Montgomery Cty., 386 Md. 104, 137, 872 A.2d 1, 20 (2005), was the
counter-beat; it is the only Article 19 case during this period written by another author, and it skipped
the modified quote from Dua, Piselli, and Lee and used the original formulation from Murphy. Of
course, an alteration of a quotation, using ellipses and brackets, is not supposed to change the meaning of the quoted phrase, let alone modify a constitutional standard. See Larsen E. Whipsnade & J.
Cheever Loophole, Responsible Advocacy and Responsible Opinions at the Federal Circuit, 35
IDEA 331, 333 (1995) (discussing “quote cropping”); Rachel Clark Hughey, Effective Appellate
Advocacy Before the Federal Circuit: A Former Law Clerk’s Perspective, 11 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 401, 422–23 (2010) (discussing “cropping” quotes or misleading uses of ellipses as intellectually dishonest and as potentially endangering the credibility of the author); Daniel M. Friedman, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the Fed. Cir., Remarks, Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 140 F.R.D. 57, 87–88 (1991) (noting when quotes
are cropped,“[t]hat’s the worst thing, leaving out a few words that change the sense of it”); David
Henige, Mis/Adventures in Mis/Quoting, 32 J. SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 123, 125 (2001) (discussing that omitting key language from a quotation by ellipses can distort the meaning of the original
quotation and that ellipses “should be high decibel alarms” to a reader given that they “immediately
tell a reader that someone tailored a quote to fit his or her needs.”).
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challenges brought under Article 19—should have been obvious, but none
of the cases adopting this modified language specifically concerned what degree of deference to apply to the legislature when analyzing Article 19 challenges.45 Jackson, however, did turn on the appropriate degree of deference
to the legislature, and yet the Court failed to announce—or even
acknowledge—its transformation of the standard from the very deferential
test created under Murphy to a standard that gives no deference to the legislature, whatsoever.46 The result is that the Jackson decision adopts (or at least
for the first time applies) a new standard for evaluating legislative modifications of common law tort remedies. Thus, rather than examining the reasonableness of the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting the Reduction of
Lead in Housing Act of 1994, and the reasonableness of the relationship between the alternative compensation system proposed by the Act and the purpose of the Act, the Court instead engaged in its own independent determination of whether a majority of its members thought the Act was
“reasonable.”47 My objections are both procedural (the Court changed the
test without announcement or acknowledgement) and substantive (the new
test cannot predict future outcomes). We can do better.
II. THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In the following pages, I will apply theories of textualism, originalism,
structuralism, moral reasoning, comparative constitutionalism, and common
law constitutional interpretation to Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. These theories help to develop a better understanding of the provision and to develop a better test for courts to apply to determine the constitutionality of legislative modifications of common law tort remedies.

45. Dua addressed whether the retrospective application of a statute that impairs a vested right
violates Article 19. 370 Md. at 644–45, 805 A.2d at 1084–85. Piselli concerned whether a statute
of repose for medical malpractice actions, as applied to an injured minor’s claim, constituted an
unreasonable restriction upon the minor’s access to the courts in violation of Article 19. 371 Md.
at 207–08, 808 A.2d at 519–20. Lee analyzed whether immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims
Act encompassed both constitutional and intentional torts. 384 Md. at 266, 863 A.2d at 309–10.
None of these issues required the Court of Appeals to consider the degree of deference owed to the
legislature.
46. Jackson, 422 Md. at 381–83, 30 A.3d at 868–69 (engaging in a purely judicial, and nondeferential, determination of whether the Court of Appeals thought that the General Assembly’s
alternative compensation system for lead paint claimants was reasonable and concluding that “the
substituted remedy under the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act for a permanently brain damaged child is totally inadequate and unreasonable”). As stated above, nothing in the text of the
Jackson opinion explicitly proclaims the withdrawal of deference to the legislature, the abandonment of the “rational basis” standard, or the adoption of a new standard. But neither did the Court
describe, evaluate, or even mention the legislature’s purpose in adopting the Act—the exact thing
to which deference would ordinarily be given and to which the relationship between it and the specific provisions of the Act would be reviewed under the “rational basis” standard.
47. Jackson, 422 Md. at 381–83, 30 A.3d at 868–89.
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A. Textualism
Textualism requires the constitutional interpreter to look carefully at the
precise words that make up the text.48 Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, while facially a forthright statement, is enigmatic in the details:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land,
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the Land.49
Article 19 can be seen as comprised of two rights, so that every injured
person (“That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property”) has a right to: (1) a remedy (“ought to have remedy by the course of
the Law of the Land”); and (2) open courts (“ought to have justice and right,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land.”). With that in mind, however, we proceed
to breaking down the provision to its fundamental blocks.
1. “That every man . . .”
Article 19 begins by defining to whom the right belongs, namely to
“every man.” In the Magna Carta and in the Maryland Declaration of Rights
as adopted in 1776 and 1851, the right was limited to every “freeman” or
“free man.”50 In 1864, as befitted a constitutional convention convened for
the principle purpose of abolishing slavery,51 the right was extended to “every
man.” Today, I am confident that, in light of the adoption of Article 46 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, this phrase is interpreted as if it read
“every person.”52 No case has yet analyzed whether nonhuman entities, including corporations, have rights protected by Article 19, but given the text,
I doubt it.53
2. “for any injury done to him in his person or property . . .”
The Maryland provision seems to apply only to tangible, physical injuries to person and property. Some sister states with similar, but not identical,
provisions also protect intangible injuries. For example, the text of Article I,

48. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 427–28 & nn.83–87.
49. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 19.
50. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 658.
51. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 11–13; Friedman, Maryland
Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 641–42.
52. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972).
53. See Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 211, 240–41, 241 n.115 (2011). But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (holding that nonprofit corporations have free speech rights).
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section 10 of the Oregon Constitution makes clear that a protected injury, in
addition to an injury to person and property, also includes an injury to reputation.54
Originally, the Maryland provision read “for every injury,” but that was
changed in 1864 to “for any injury.” The change was proposed by the Constitutional Convention’s Committee on the Declaration of Rights (whose proceedings were not recorded), adopted without comment by the convention
body, and the revised constitution was adopted by the people without public
comment as to the intended meaning of this change.55 Of course, neither
phraseology can be literally correct as some injuries are so trivial as not to
merit remedies. After all, as they say in Latin, de minimis non curat lex (the
law doesn’t bother with trifles).
As will be discussed below, in some states with analogous remedy provisions, court decisions have said that the legislature may define what constitutes an injury. In the states that use it, this construction causes the constitutional guarantee to disappear into itself: by changing what constitutes an
injury, the legislature can eliminate the necessity for the judiciary to provide
a remedy.56
For me, the word “injury” provides an important reminder of our interpretive obligation. As will be clear below, I think that an analysis based on
the separation of powers is very helpful in understanding these provisions.57
But, we shouldn’t overstate the competition between the legislature and the
judiciary and forget that this provision is principally about tort victims, people who are harmed, sometimes grievously, in their lives, their bodies, their
property, or by the acts of others. And they are people to whom we have a
constitutional obligation to ensure that they be permitted a recovery for those
injuries.
3. “ought . . .”
The Court of Appeals has recently instructed:
The word ‘ought’ appears in twenty-eight of the forty-seven articles of the current M[aryland] D[eclaration of] R[ights], almost all
of which originated in the 1776 M[aryland] D[eclaration of]
R[ights]. Examination of those provisions reveals a full spectrum

54. OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 376 P.3d 998, 1005,
1028 (Or. 2016).
55. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 694 n.310.
56. FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6–7.
57. See infra notes 100–110 and accompanying text.
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of meanings depending on context, ranging in character from a
mere statement of policy to an imperative command.58
Although the Court evaluated the use of “ought” in many contexts, it did not
comment on its use in Article 19. I suspect that a court would interpret
“ought” in both places that it appears in Article 19 to be nearly mandatory,
while allowing flexibility for de minimis injury, incomplete remedies, and the
like.
4. “to have remedy . . . “
For our purposes, the key question is what is meant by the word “remedy,” and to what extent that meaning is fixed or may change over time.
Nothing in the word itself gives us a hint.
5. “to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any
denial, and speedily without delay . . .”
The language of Article 19 that promises “justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay” is derived directly from Coke’s Institutes.59 Although there is nothing in the text that
compels the result, courts uniformly interpret this to be a procedural guarantee without independent content.60 Moreover, this language is usually read
as if Coke’s high-flying rhetoric is not there, but as a rather concrete guarantee that courts will be open.61
6. “by the course of the Law of the Land” or “ according to the Law
of the Land”
It is standard for Maryland courts to note that the phrase “Law of the
Land,” as used both here and in Article 24, means “due process of law.”62
While this definition is occasionally helpful,63 here it obscures, as the critical
question isn’t what it is, but who says what it is. If the meaning of the phrase
“Law of the Land” is restricted to judge-made common law, then Article 19
might mean that an injured person is entitled to a common law tort remedy
58. Miles v. State, 435 Md. 540, 555, 80 A.3d 242, 251 (2013). For a pre-Miles interpretation
of the use of the word “ought” in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, see Friedman, Tracing the
Lineage, supra note 9, at 967 n.162.
59. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55–
56 (4th ed. 1671).
60. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971); FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6.
61. David Schuman, Oregon’s Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 38 (1986) (suggesting that this is a statement of abstract principle—courts
should be “non-secret” and “accessible to scrutiny”).
62. See, e.g., In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187, 133 A.2d 441, 447 (1957).
63. But see FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6-5 (stating that “[a]lthough due course and due process
clauses are often misread as equivalents . . . they are not the same”).
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and the legislature is not allowed to modify that remedy. Alternatively, if the
phrase “Law of the Land” includes both judge-made common law and legislative enactments, then at least the text would admit the possibility that the
legislature could freely substitute a new remedy for the traditional common
law remedy. Similarly, in the second clause—the open courts clause—“Law
of the Land” could mean that courts may be closed only as permitted by the
common law or also as modified by the legislature.
Finally, while it is conceptually possible, I cannot imagine a
hairsbreadth of difference between “by the course of” and “according to.”
7. Placing Emphasis
Two commentators have emphasized different parts of the analogous
provision in the Oregon Constitution to come to two diametrically opposed,
text-based interpretations.64 David Schuman focuses his analysis on the language that guarantees a “remedy” for every “injury.”65 As a result, Schuman
calls the Oregon provision a “remedy guarantee” and proposes an interpretation that would allow the legislature to determine what constitutes an injury,
but once the legislature determines what constitutes an injury, the provision
guarantees that a remedy will be provided.66 By contrast, Jonathan M. Hoffman calls these “open courts” provisions, and focuses his analysis on the next
phrase “by due course of [l]aw” (as it appears in Oregon’s version) or, by
analogy, “by the course of the Law of the Land” (as it appears in Maryland’s
Article 19).67 By shifting the focus from one piece of text to another, Hoffman argues for a totally different interpretation—one that rejects any limits
on statutory replacement of common law remedies, so long as there is a procedurally regular process.68 Thus, two commentators reading the same text
come to opposite conclusions: Schuman reads the text to cut the legislature
out of the process and give the judiciary nearly complete control over remedies; Hoffman reads the same text to give the legislature nearly complete
control, with the judiciary only capable of intervening in a wildly extreme
situation in which plaintiffs are deprived of procedural regularity.

64. The Oregon provision is a direct lineal descendent of Maryland’s provision. Friedman,
Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 1002–03 n.338.
65. Schuman, supra note 61, at 42–43, 67–69; Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra note 3,
at 1220, 1223–25; see also Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 135–36 (1970).
66. Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra note 3, at 1220.
67. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause
of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1296, 1314 (1995) [hereinafter Hoffman, By the Course
of the Law]; see also Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to
Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001) [hereinafter,
Hoffman, Questions Before Answers].
68. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law, supra note 67, at 1318.
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Although a Maryland court could decide to follow Schuman’s pro-judicial position or Hoffman’s pro-legislative interpretation, there is nothing in
the text to point to one over the other. 69
8. Intratextualism
Intratextualism is a form of textualism, added to the constitutional interpreter’s bag of tricks by Akhil Reed Amar of Yale Law School.70 Professor
Amar suggests using recurrences of language within a constitution to inform
meaning.71 Unfortunately, however, there is nothing in the other two uses of
the phrase “Law of the Land” in the Maryland Declaration of Rights—once
again in Article 19 and again in Article 24—to improve our understanding.72
More promising is a look at Article 3 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights of 1776 (currently codified at Article 5). That provision explicitly
guarantees Marylanders’ rights to English law:
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law
of England . . . according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their
first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as
have been since made in England or Great Britain, and have been
introduced, used, and practi[c]ed by the courts of law, or equity;
and also to all acts of assembly in force on the first of June seventeen hundred and seventy-four, except such as may have since expired, or have been, or may be altered by acts of convention, or this

69. Interestingly, the Jackson opinion quotes Piselli (authored by the same judge), which, in
turn, cites to both Schuman and Hoffman but does not acknowledge or resolve the two authors’
antithetical interpretation of the text. See Jackson v. Dackman Co., 422 Md. 357, 376–77, 30 A.3d
854, 865 (2011).
70. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). Another aspect of intratextualism, perhaps at its intersection with structuralism, counsels the interpreter to read provisions holistically rather than the atomistic manner in which we generally treat constitutional provisions. See generally BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(2015). If there is a way to read a deeper meaning into Article 19 or the Maryland Declaration of
Rights as a whole rather than in its constituent parts, I haven’t found it.
71. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 70, at 748 (explaining that intratextualism “gives interpreters yet another set of clues as they search for constitutional meaning and gives rise to yet another
rich technique of constitutional interpretation”).
72. With respect to the use of the phrase “Law of the Land” as it appears in Article 24, the
Court of Appeals has said that it means “due process of law, according to the course and usage of
the common law.” Wright v. Wright’s Lessee, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852); see also Grove v. Todd, 41
Md. 633 (1875); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365 (1838). For a discussion
of the relationship between and possible redundancy amongst Articles 19 and 24, see Friedman,
Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 1001 n.330. See also supra note 52.
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Declaration of Rights— subject nevertheless to the revision of, and
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.73
Thus, Maryland’s constitutional framers explicitly declared the existence of a right to retain both English common law and both English and Maryland statutory law. Of course, this does not answer the question entirely
either. On the one hand, Article 3 demonstrates that the constitutional drafters knew the difference between common law and statutory law and knew
how to describe that difference in the text of the constitution. On the other
hand, just because the framers knew how to split out the common law from
the statutory law in Article 3 does not imply that they felt the need to do so
in Article 19 when describing the “Law of the Land.” Moreover, they might
simply have preferred to retain the ancient phraseology.
At the end of the day, while textualism may give us insight into the
meaning of the provision, it does not give us a definitive interpretation of the
term “Law of the Land” or resolve to what extent the legislature may modify
common law remedies.
B. Originalism
Originalism is concerned with the original public meaning of the words
of the provision at the time that they were adopted.74 Here, the challenges
facing a state constitutional interpreter are significantly more complex than
those facing an interpreter of the federal Constitution. An interpreter of the
federal Constitution generally has to master the historical record surrounding
the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1867 (and, to a lesser extent, the historical record surrounding
the adoption of other amendments that may be relevant to a contested case).
Looking at Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires one to
try to understand the original public meaning at many historical moments,
including (1) the original adoption of the Magna Carta by King John in 1215;
(2) the reaffirmation of the Magna Carta by King Henry III in 1225; (3) the
interpretation of the provision by Sir Edward Coke in his Second Institute;
(4) the adoption of the provision in the Maryland Constitution of 1776; and

73. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 3 (1776) (reprinted in Friedman, Maryland Declaration of
Rights, supra note 9, at 650). The successor to this provision may be found at Article 5 of the
current Maryland Declaration of Rights. For a general discussion of the long struggle by Maryland
colonists to import English statutes, see HOWARD, supra note 38, at 53–65.
74. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 433 n.122 (describing
originalism); see also, Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2017). Mr. Christiansen has done exemplary work in uncovering the extent to which originalism is the principle interpretive tool in state
constitutional law. I don’t think his research goes so far, however, as to suggest that it is the only
legitimate method. See Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 415–
16, 433–36 (discussing foundationalist and nonfoundationalist strands in originalist interpretation).
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potentially, (5) its re-adoption in the Maryland constitutions of 1851, 1864,
and 1867.
Originalism purports to confine its adherents to the original public
meaning associated with a constitutional provision.75 In other writings, I
have championed the critical importance of historical research to the modern
interpretation of state constitutions but have rejected the foundationalist aspects of originalism, by which the original popular understanding of a constitutional provision is supposed to determine conclusively the outcome of a
current controversy.76 Here, modern interpreters come to diametrically opposed views of the meaning of Article 19 because of their different understandings of a seemingly unknowable aspect of the provision’s history.77
The history of Article 19 begins in feudal England. King John’s court
system was corrupt and administered justice for a fee. Those seeking justice
in the courts had to purchase writs; the more you paid for your writ, the faster
and more successful your case would be.78 This and other grievances led a
group of barons to rebel and, ultimately, forced King John to accept the
Magna Carta, a series of limitations on his monarchal powers. Amongst these
was a prohibition, subsequently numbered as Chapter 40, prohibiting the selling of writs: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right
or justice.”79 Another related provision, subsequently numbered as Chapter
39, guaranteed the due process of laws: “No freemen shall be taken or . . .
imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers
or . . . by the law of the land.”80

75. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 433–36.
76. Id. at 415–16, 433–36.
77. Jonathan Hoffman and Judge William C. Koch, Jr. provide contrasting viewpoints. Hoffman reads the history and concludes that these “open courts” provisions were intended to prevent
executive interference, not to prevent the legislature from modifying or abolishing common law tort
remedies. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law, supra note 67, at 1316. Judge Koch reads the same
history and concludes that these “open courts” provisions were intended to prevent executive and
legislative interference with common law tort remedies. William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee
Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 408–10, 449–51 (1997).
78. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395–98 (2d ed. 1914); A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 15–16 (1964); H. D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1917). The extensive history of the influence of the
Magna Carta and Sir Edward Coke’s Second Institute on state constitutional provisions such as
Article 19 has also been recounted more recently. Koch, supra note 77, at 348–68.
79. The original text was in Latin; this is a standard English translation. MCKECHNIE, supra
note 78, at 395 (Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta of 1215); HOWARD, supra note 78, at 15; Koch,
supra note 77, at 350 n.96.
80. Again, the original text was in Latin; this is a standard English translation. MCKECHNIE,
supra note 78, at 375 (Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta of 1215); HOWARD, supra note 78, at 14;
Koch, supra note 77, at 350 n.95.
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In 1225, King Henry III reorganized and reaffirmed the Magna Carta.
In so doing, the former Chapters 39 and 40 were combined in a new Chapter
25:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of any
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed or banished,
or any other way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send
upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the law
of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay
right or justice.81
Three hundred and fifty years later, Sir Edward Coke translated and republished this provision of the Magna Carta in his Institutes, a four-volume
commentary on the laws of England. Coke’s translation is suspect—it has
been criticized as “more enthusiastic than accurate”—and was certainly intended to be used in his campaign for judicial independence and for the primacy of the common law.82 As Coke had it:
[E]very subject of this Realm, for injury done to him . . . may take
his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice, and right
for the injury done him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.83
According to one commentator, the language of the provision “articulate[s] the very abuses against which Coke railed: the sale of common-law
justice through corruption and the denial and delay of justice through external
interference with the courts by the King and his ministers.”84 To translate
into our modern terms—terms that describe concepts that did not even exist
for many years—Coke was concerned about the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of government.85 Critically, Coke
was not expressing concern about the separation of powers between legislative and judicial powers, as that was not the controversy with which he was
preoccupied. It is also worth noting that Coke did not explain the nature of
the right to a remedy that the Magna Carta was supposed to protect.
Coke’s Institutes were very popular with American colonists.86 It was
natural that when the colonists sought to draft their own constitutions, declarations, and bills of rights they would turn to Coke’s Institutes for inspiration
81. MAGNA CARTA, ch. XXIX (1225).
82. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law, supra note 67, at 1286, 1291–93.
83. COKE, supra note 59, at 55–56; FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE
MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 365 (1948).
84. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law, supra note 67, at 1294.
85. Id. at 1288.
86. Schuman, supra note 61, at 39 (regarding Coke’s Institutes’ influence); see Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 480 nn.194–98 & accompanying text (2003) (regarding
Coke’s influence on America); Charles F. Mullett, Coke and the American Revolution, 12
ECONOMICA 457 (1932) (same); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
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and guidance. The Maryland constitutional framers, drafting our Declaration
of Rights in 1776, copied Coke’s translation of the Magna Carta nearly word
for word:
That every freeman, for every injury done to him in his goods,
lands, or person, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of
the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale,
fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to
the Law of the Land.87
This was the first adaptation of this provision into a state constitution,88
but variations on it were subsequently adopted in many of the other states.89
The Maryland provision has seen a few textual adjustments over the last 240
years since American Independence, but in general, the provision remains
remarkably similar to Coke’s.90
At some point, however, the understanding of the provision—and provisions like it in other states—subtly changed. These provisions are no
longer used to protect judicial independence from executive overreach. The
problem that this provision was originally intended to correct—the King’s
selling of judicial writs—has (over the last 800 years) ceased to be a problem.
Rather, these provisions are now understood in some degree to protect the
common law from statutory changes.91 The difficult question for the
originalist is when did this transformation occur? Did it occur before or after
Maryland included this provision in its Declaration of Rights of 1776? Did
it occur before any of the subsequent re-adoptions of the provision in the
Maryland Declaration of Rights in 1850, 1864, or 1867?92 Unfortunately for
the originalist, we do not know.
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31 (1967); MCKECHNIE, supra note 78, at 120–21; JAMES R. STONER,
JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 21 (1992);
87. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 19 (1776) (reprinted in Friedman, Maryland Declaration
of Rights, supra note 9, at 658); see also Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 1002
n.336.
88. Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 1002–03 & n.338; see also Friedman,
Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 681 n.99.
89. See FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6-3–6-4 nn.10–11 (reporting that thirty-seven of fifty state
constitutions contain an analogous provision); Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra note 3, at
1201 n.25 (reporting that thirty-nine of fifty state constitutions contain an analogous provision).
Judge Koch says that the right number is thirty-eight, and the variation in the estimates is caused by
the way in which commentators count New Mexico. Koch, supra note 77, at 341 n.27 and accompanying text.
90. Subsequent changes in the text of the provision are reprinted in Friedman, Maryland Declaration of Rights, supra note 9, at 658.
91. It is also not plain whether there is any “public meaning,” original or otherwise, regarding
this provision.
92. It is important to understand that after each of Maryland’s constitutional conventions, the
old document was completely repealed and a whole new document was adopted, even if specific
provisions were exactly the same. It is not plain what value an originalist would place on the subsequent re-adoptions of this constitutional provision. Imagine, for example, that we knew that at
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It is important to rehearse—if briefly—the underlying originalist theory.
According to the originalists, judicial review, the process by which unelected
judges can reject the product of democratically-elected legislatures, is aberrational in our system, and can only be justified when judges limit their use
of judicial review to those situations in which the legislation violates the original public understanding of the constitutional provision because, in effect,
the adoption of the constitutional provision was the superior democratic moment.93
The difficulty is in ascertaining what the relevant people knew, and
when. In 1215, when King John accepted the Magna Carta, the King and the
barons readily understood Article 40. It meant that King John would not sell
writs anymore. The provision did not have a broader meaning. Moreover,
in that agrarian, often illiterate, feudal society it is not clear what the “original
public meaning” of the Magna Carta was, or why, as a theoretical matter, it
should matter. Even acceptance of the Magna Carta—the first great limitation on a King’s powers—can’t be described as a “superior democratic moment.”
In describing the Magna Carta in his Institutes, Coke seemingly broadened the application of the provision from its narrowest reading—no selling
of writs—to a broader reading—no royal interference with courts. What we
cannot know is at what level of generality Coke understood this move, at
what level of generality the public understood it, and at what level of generality the Maryland framers, working 125 years later, understood it. Was
Coke’s move only viewed as a broadening of the notion of judicial independence from executive interference, or could it have been viewed as a more
generalized notion of judicial independence from interference by any other
branch of government? This seemingly minor point—unknowable across the
intervening centuries—is the entire game for the originalist. If Coke, his
the time of the adoption of the precursor to Article 19 in 1776, the public meaning associated with
the provision was that it intended only to prohibit the King from selling writs or otherwise interfering with judicial independence. Imagine further, however, that by 1850 (or 1864 or 1867), the
public meaning had clearly shifted to encompass protection for common law from legislative encroachment. Would the simple re-adoption of the same language without discussion of the new
meaning be sufficient to allow an originalist to adopt the new meaning? What quantum of textual
change or discussion of new meaning would be sufficient? Further, should “Maryland judges . . .
contemplate the consequences of originalist doctrines when the document they are interpreting was
drafted by 118 white men who all belonged to a single political party; when the original text of the
document included painfully racist provisions and . . . when a substantial percentage of the framers
were ardently racist by today’s standards and somewhat racist by the standards of their own time”?
JOHN J. CONNOLLY, REPUBLICAN PRESS AT A DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION: REPORTS OF THE 1867
MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BY THE BALTIMORE AMERICAN AND COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISER xxiv (2018) (ebook). An analogous issue arises when a state adopts a remedy provision from another state’s constitution without significant discussion or debate. Schuman, The Right
to a Remedy, supra note 3, at 1201 (discussing Oregon’s adoption of remedy provision from Indiana’s constitution).
93. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 434.
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contemporaries, and the Maryland framers saw his restatement of the Magna
Carta as a move for judicial independence from executive control, then today,
for the originalist, the provision’s reach must also be limited.94 If, on the
other hand, Coke, his contemporaries, and the Maryland framers saw in his
restatement of the Magna Carta a more generalized statement of judicial independence and common law supremacy, then a modern interpretation would
have to include a notion of the protection of judicial independence from legislative control as well.95 The problem is originalism’s unrealistic expectation that a modern researcher will find sufficiently definitive evidence to be
dispositive of modern cases.96
C. Structural Reasoning
Structuralism suggests that, in addition to the text of a constitutional
provision, we should also reason from the structure and relation created by
the text.97 Thus, although the terms federalism, majoritarianism, and separation of powers do not appear in the text of the federal Constitution, these
underlying structural concepts inform our understanding of the document,
and those concepts should be relied upon to interpret the meaning.98 The
application of the structuralist methodology to state constitutions is often difficult99 but will provide a useful lens here.

94. See, e.g., Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989); Schuman, The Right
to a Remedy, supra note 3, at 1200 (“Looking to the history of the remedy guarantee to determine
what ‘evils’ it was intended to ‘cure’ thus leads to diametrically opposite interpretations, depending
on which ‘history’ is relevant.”).
95. The contemporaneous evidence is scant. There are no known records from the deliberative
process of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1776. Friedman, Maryland Declaration of
Rights, supra note 9, at 640, 679 n.40. The Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights of
1776 did contain two other provisions declaring judicial independence. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS.
art. 30 (1776); MD. CONST. art. 40 (1776).
96. For example, the differing reports on the constitutional convention of 1867 by different
sides of the partisan press frustrate this goal. See CONNOLLY, supra note 92, at xxiv (“[R]eports of
Convention debates may reveal . . . intent, but like many issues of statutory interpretation a Maryland case can be found to support competing viewpoints.”). Jonathan M. Hoffman is more optimistic, arguing that with more historical research we might come to a definitive understanding of these
types of provisions. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers, supra note 67, at 1043. I am less confident.
97. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22
(1969); see also Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 458–59 (applying structuralism to state constitutional interpretation).
98. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES 321 (3d ed. 2007).
99. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 458–59 (first citing G.
Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1194 (1992); and then citing
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 191–94 (1998)).
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1. Separation of Powers100
Questions about legislative modification of common law tort remedies
arise precisely at the intersection between judicial and legislative authority.101
The basic structure is in three steps: (1) over time the judiciary develops a
common law tort remedy rule; (2) the legislature passes a law modifying that
rule; (3) the judiciary evaluates the constitutionality of the modification.
That arrangement doesn’t offend anyone’s notion of the separation of powers
despite that there are two branches determining the substantive content of
Maryland tort law.102

100. Another form of structuralist analysis might attempt to discern something from the changes
in the respective powers of the branches of government in relation to each other. Regretfully, however, I don’t think this form of analysis helps us understand Article 19 any better. The Maryland
Constitution and Declaration of Rights of 1776—like many other constitutions of the period—favored the legislative branch over the executive. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 11, at 6 (describing the Maryland Constitution); Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions
of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American
Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (1989) (describing allocation of powers in “first
wave” state constitutions). Over time, that relationship has flipped, and Maryland’s Governor today
is one of the most powerful state executives in the country. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 95. I have not detected a similar shift in the relationship between
the judiciary and the other branches of government; rather, the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights since the beginning and continuing today have continuously stressed the importance
of a strong and independent judiciary. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11,
at 67–68; Friedman, Tracing the Lineage, supra note 9, at 984–86. Thus, I don’t think we can make
an argument that Article 19 reflects a trend in the relative power of the judiciary vis-à-vis other
branches of government. But see Ned Miltenberg, The Revolutionary ‘Right to a Remedy’, TRIAL,
March 1998. Interestingly, Miltenberg’s time sequence, which describes legislative supremacy in
Revolutionary-era constitutions as having been curtailed by remedy provisions in later state constitutions, beginning with Massachusetts’ 1780 constitution, doesn’t have explanatory power in Maryland, where the remedy provision was included in our Revolutionary-era Declaration of Rights.
101. See generally Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013)
(discussing the power of courts and legislature respectively to replace contributory negligence with
comparative negligence). Ironically, however, Coleman (written by the same author as Jackson),
pushes the development of tort law away from the judiciary and toward the legislature—precisely
the opposite direction as Jackson. Donald G. Gifford, The Death of the Common Law: Judicial
Abdication and Contributory Negligence in Maryland, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 19 (2013)
(stating that Coleman signals a “radical redefinition constraining the lawful authority of Maryland’s
highest common law court”); see also Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning
Liability in Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 701 (2014).
102. My understanding of the separation of powers described here is functionalist, not formalist.
See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1522–30 (1991) (describing formalism and functionalism in federal separation of powers analysis
and proposing a new analytic method based on maximizing ordered liberty). Although the existence
of a textual separation of powers provision, MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8, might have led to
formalist interpretations, the Maryland Court of Appeals’ separation of powers decisions have, in
my view, demonstrated a functionalist bent. FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 11, at 34–36 (“Despite the seemingly absolute separation of powers, Maryland courts have
never interpreted Article 8 in an unqualified fashion, always preferring a more flexible interpretation. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland has said, ‘the separation of powers concept may consti-
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Structuralism counsels us to favor an interpretation that comports with
the separation of powers.103 For me, this means to prefer an interpretation
that is respectful of both branches, does not allow one branch to overwhelm
the other, and assigns to each branch duties that comport with its competence.104
I would, therefore, be skeptical of a standard of review that required the
courts to automatically uncritically accept any tort remedy that the legislature
decided to substitute for a common law remedy. By the same token, I am
skeptical of the standard of review adopted by the Court of Appeals in Jackson, which allows the Court’s subjective view that a substitute tort remedy is
“unreasonable” to overrule the judgment of the legislative branch.
A brief review of the Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act of 1994,
which the Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional in Jackson v. Dackman
Co., demonstrates the importance of a court investigating the legislative history to determine the reasonableness of a legislative modification of a common law tort remedy. The bill file reveals that the Act was a compromise
between competing concerns, including on one side, concerns about the care
and compensation of the individual victims of lead poisoning and prevention
of future incidences of lead poisoning and, on the other side, concerns about
high jury verdicts leading, in turn, to higher insurance premiums or an unavailability of insurance altogether. The legislature took seriously the landlord’s claim that without significant relief, they would simply walk away
tutionally encompass a sensible degree of elasticity.’” (quoting Department of Nat. Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 220, 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975))); see also Schisler v. State,
394 Md. 519, 558, 907 A.2d 175, 197 (2006) (quoting FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 11, at 34–35)).
103. For an analysis of remedy provisions in exclusively separation of powers terms, see Matthew W. Light, Note, Who’s the Boss?: Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State Constitutional
Law, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315 (2001). See also FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6-9–6-11 (describing theoretical positions, gleaned from the various “tests” announced for examining state constitutional right to remedy provisions, in separation of powers terms).
104. For example, the general paradigm of disputes resolved in the judiciary are bilateral disputes, with testimony from fact witnesses and experts hired by parties, at the conclusion of which
one party is declared the winner. The paradigm of legislative dispute-resolution is very different,
frequently involving compromise solutions for multi-sided disputes. I think that sometimes the
judiciary fails to appreciate the important differences between the ways it obtains information and
the methods that the legislative branch employs. This helps explain the judiciary’s denigrating the
evidence on which the legislature relies as merely “anecdotal.” See, e.g., Muskin v. State Dep’t of
Assessments & Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 550, 551 & n.1, 559, 564, 30 A.3d 962, 965 & n.1, 970–71,
973 (2011); see also State v. Goldberg, 437 Md. 191, 197, 85 A.3d 231, 234–35 (2014). But see
Jackson v. Dackman Co., 181 Md. App. 546, 574–75, 956 A.2d 861, 878 (2008) (citing Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993)) (recognizing legislative branch obtains information differently
and frequently anecdotally). See also Donald G. Gifford, The Death of Causation: Mass Products
Torts’ Incomplete Incorporation of Social Welfare Principles, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943,
1001–02 (2006) (discussing legislative and judicial competencies to respond to mass products torts).
For a remarkable example of inter-branch conflict regarding the allocation of responsibility for determining tort remedies, see State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062
(Ohio 1999).
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from large segments of the rental market, especially rental stock available to
low income residents, thus blighting urban parts of the State and increasing
homelessness.105
The legislation adopted offered landlords a choice: clean up the lead
paint in your rental units and, in exchange, your liability will be capped at
$17,000; fail to make the rental units safer, and continue to risk costly verdicts in the tort system. In effect, the Maryland General Assembly, faced
with limited resources in a failing system, allocated a relatively small amount
to individual victims and relatively more to improving the rental housing
stock to avoid future injuries. Like many compromises, nobody was exactly
happy with the outcome.106 Then-Dean Donald Gifford of the University of
Maryland School of Law, who had chaired an eighteen-month study commissioned by the legislature, expressed his “strong personal opposition” to the
bill that became the Act.107 Dean Gifford identified two defects in the bill:
first, that it did not require periodic re-inspections of the rental properties and,
second, a timing concern that the immunity attaches before clean up, not vice
versa.108 Dean Gifford’s strong critique, however, did not criticize the
$17,000 cap as being insufficient,109 from which I draw the implication that
he felt the cap amount was either sufficient or the best that could be achieved
under the circumstances. Moreover, it is hard to argue with the success of
the Act on its own terms. Housing stock has improved, and the incidences
and severity of childhood lead paint poisoning have been greatly reduced.110
105. LEAD PAINT POISONING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION
(1994).
106. “The Act is unique in that its passage was supported by child advocates, government officials[,] and landlords. Government officials and child advocates would have preferred tougher
standards and broader benefits. Landlords lobbied hard for greater tort immunity and lesser risk
prevention measures in their properties.” D. Robert Enten, Lead Paint Law Will Dramatically
Change Rental Property Business, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), June 8, 1994.
107. Letter from Donald G. Gifford, Chair, Lead Paint Poisoning Comm’n, to the Honorable
Ronald A. Guns, Chair, House Comm. on Envtl. Matters (Mar. 14, 1994) (on file with author).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Maryland’s Department of the Environment (MDE) has noted “a significant drop in both
the extent and severity of lead exposure” in Maryland and attributes “[m]uch of the decline . . . to
the implementation of [the Act].” MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, LEAD POISONING PREVENTION
PROGRAM, CHILDHOOD BLOOD LEAD SURVEILLANCE IN MARYLAND, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 8
(2015) (“The overall Statewide activities to reduce (eliminate) childhood lead poisoning resulted in
a significant drop in both the extent and severity of lead exposure among children over the years. . . .
Much of the decline can be attributed to the implementation of [the Act] and the increased emphasis
on the testing of children living in identified “At Risk” areas in Maryland.”); see also DONALD G.
GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES 115, n.61 (2010) (“the … Maryland statute appear[s] to have had a significant effect in reducing the incidence of children with
E[levated] B[loos] L[evels]”) (citing MDE 2004 Annual Report). MDE does not provide data to
support this conclusion and I think that there are three important caveats. First, it is impossible to
compare Maryland’s reduction to that of other states. Maryland’s “significant” reduction came in
the context of a nationwide reduction, but because of limitations in the data, it is impossible to
compare Maryland’s rate of reduction with that of the country as a whole and between Maryland
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My point is not to endorse the compromise that the legislature made in
1994. In hindsight, it might have been more skeptical of landlord threats to
walk away from their source of income.111 It might have been more generous
with benefits to claimants. My point rather, is that the legislature is the
branch of our government best equipped to study a problem from multiple
perspectives (current claimants, future claimants, other tenants, landlords, insurance companies, etc.) and to broker a compromise amongst them.112
(There are, of course, limits to the appropriate deference to the legislative
branch).
As described above, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Jackson v. Dackman Co. declined to explore the legislative history of the Act it was declaring
unconstitutional. It evaluated the merits of a compromise after looking only
at what the claimants gave up without considering what the other parties contributed.113
2. Making Sense, Part 1
An additional tenet of structuralism is to find constitutional interpretations that make “sense.”114 An interpretation that recreates the worst errors
of the past fails this test. Allowing judges to use Article 19 to substitute their
judgment for the judgment of the democratically-elected branches of government repeats the error of the Lochner-era, in which the United States Supreme
and other states. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. TOTALS BLOOD LEAD
SURVEILLANCE, 1997–2015,
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/data/Chart_Website_StateConfirmedByYear_1997_2015.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2018); CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, LEARN MORE ABOUT CDC’S CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING DATA,
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/data/learnmore.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). Thus, we cannot
say definitively that Maryland had a sharper decrease than other states, which makes it impossible
to compare Maryland to states with and without legislation similar to the Act. Second, even if we
could establish that Maryland had a sharper rate of reduction than other states, it is not clear from
the data to what factor that reduction should be attributed. It might be attributable to discrepancies
in testing regimes, more effective advocacy groups, the Act, or other reasons. And, third, it is not
necessarily clear what aspect of the Act led to the reduction or whether a different legislative compromise might have had a similar, or even better, result. With those caveats in mind, however, we
have to take MDE—the agency assigned to lead poisoning surveillance in Maryland—at its word
that at least part of the reduction in extent and severity of lead poisoning in the State of Maryland
is attributable to the Act.
111. David J. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance Claims Explosion:
An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REV. 909 (1988) (refuting claims of a tort claims explosion,
including for lead paint exposure, in a slightly earlier time period).
112. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1162–63 (2005) (advising caution in the use of state constitutional litigation to
counter legislative reforms and noting that “[u]nder the guise of judicial review, state courts have
all too often used state constitutional provisions to interfere with experiments in public policy that
over time have come to be widely respected”).
113. See supra note 14 (noting that the Court looked only at the “immunity” provisions (what
claimants gave up) rather than at the compensation (what claimants received in return)).
114. BLACK, supra note 97, at 22.
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Court used the Justices’ peculiar notions of substantive due process to substitute its economic theories for those adopted by state legislatures.115 Today,
Lochner is nearly universally condemned as a “wrong turn” in American constitutional law.116 For most, the error of the Lochner-era was the Court’s
aggressive judicial activism,117 and the lesson learned from that era was one
of judicial restraint and deference to the decisions of democratically elected
legislatures.118 The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the Lochner doctrine in
1937 and adopted a deferential, rational basis test.119
The Court of Appeals of Maryland (along with many sister state supreme courts) continued to apply a less deferential “real and substantial relation” standard to evaluate legislative enactments regulating economic activity for forty more years after Lochner was dead.120 Only in 1977 did the
Maryland Court of Appeals follow the United States Supreme Court back to
a more deferential standard of review of economic legislation:
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. . . .
‘We are not concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.’ Legislative bodies have broad scope to
experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to

115. See Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 413–14 (discussing Lochner).
116. I am not persuaded by modern attempts to resurrect the reputation of Lochner. See, e.g.,
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 214
(2004); David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the
Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 326–27 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004);
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128–
29 (1985); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12–13 (2003); David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s
Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). In the end, however, it doesn’t much matter to me
if “the Lochner error” was as grave as conventional wisdom suggests it was. For present purposes,
it is sufficient for Lochner to stand as the convenient archetype of misguided judicial activism in
support of the Court’s idiosyncratic economic theories.
117. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1385 (2001) (noting that “scholars [have] painted
Lochner as the primary example of judicial activism”).
118. See id.
119. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937).
120. See, e.g., Md. St. Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 511, 312 A.2d 216, 225
(1973); Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-a-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 120, 311 A.2d 242, 252 (1973); see
also FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 58 (discussing the “real and
substantial relationship” test); MICHAEL CARLTON TOLLEY, STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
MARYLAND 121 (1992) (same); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills
of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 389–90 (1980) (same).
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‘subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our Government . . . .’121
The Court’s opinion in 1977, rejecting the “real and substantial relation”
test under Article 24, reflects the same separation of powers concerns that I
also apply to Article 19. It would be odd indeed for the Maryland Court of
Appeals now to adopt a standard of review under Article 19 that returns to
the erroneous path of “intolerable supervision” that the federal courts abandoned in 1937 and the Maryland courts rejected in 1977.
Of course, this analysis may also be wrong. It may be that, because of
the dictates of Article 19, a court’s review of substitute tort remedies ought
to be more searching and less deferential than its review of economic legislation. If so, that review still ought to be accomplished, it seems to me, in a
way that is more respectful to the legislative judgment than was done in Jackson.
3. Making Sense, Part 2
Finally, I think structuralism’s search for sensible interpretations compels skepticism about interpretations that suggest that the outcome might depend on which plaintiff arrives at the court first. Substituted tort remedies
always involve winners and losers between plaintiffs and defendants, and
also within the class of plaintiffs and within the class of defendants.
Let’s take workers’ compensation as an example. At the dawn of industrialization, tort law overwhelmingly favored employers. Injured workers
would almost invariably see their claims against their employers defeated by
common law tort rules including the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of the risk. Workers’ compensation systems were a
legislative compromise that took these workplace injuries outside of the tort
system and created a no-fault system. For most injured workers, the result of
the workers’ compensation compromise was that they could recover in circumstances that would have barred recovery at common law. For a small
number of injured workers, however, those whose claims could have survived in the common law system, their recoveries were likely diminished because their damages were to be computed by the workers’ compensation
schedules rather than by a jury award.122
121. Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 425, 370 A.2d 1102, 1111 (1977) (quoting
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1963)); see also FRIEDMAN, THE MD. STATE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 58–59; TOLLEY, supra note 120, at 117–23.
122. The history of the “grand bargain” of workers’ compensation has been frequently told. See,
e.g., Daniel T. Doherty, Jr., Historical Development of Work[ers’] Compensation, in C. ARTHUR
WILLIAMS, JR., & PETER S. BARTH, COMPENDIUM ON WORK[ERS’] COMPENSATION 11 (Marcus
Rosenblum ed., 1973); PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE
WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (2000); Price V. Fishback & Shawn
Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L.
& ECON. 305 (1998). For an historical description of Maryland’s version of this “grand bargain,”
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Courts traditionally evaluate only the parties before them. That traditional paradigm, however, does not make as much sense when evaluating an
alternative compensation system. Imagine the injured workers we saw
above. For the vast majority of potential plaintiffs, the new workers’ compensation system was an improvement; they received a small but sure remedy. For a small minority of plaintiffs, however, the workers’ compensation
system caused a diminished recovery. These are the plaintiffs whose claims
could survive the gauntlet of the old tort law defenses and whose severe injuries might have resulted in compensatory and punitive damages far in excess of those allowed under the workers’ compensation schedules. For them,
of course, that new alternative compensation system doesn’t look so great.123
My point here is that if a court evaluates the constitutionality of an alternative compensation system by its fairness or reasonability to the parties
before it, too much depends on the character of those parties. And, in turn,
too much turns on which sort of plaintiffs get their cases to the appellate
courts first. I think structural reasoning compels us to be skeptical of a test
that puts too much emphasis on the characteristics of the individual parties.
Thus, when evaluating proposed standards of review under Article 19, I favor
those that include an evaluation of the reasonability or fairness of an alternative compensation system as a whole, not just for the individual parties in a
pending case.124 Zi’Tashia Jackson was an attractive plaintiff for the Court
of Appeals to consider, given her grievous injuries and comparatively minor
recovery. Had another less-attractive, less-injured plaintiff arrived at the
Court first, however, the Court might have calculated differently.

see RICHARD P. GILBERT ET AL., MARYLAND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 1-1–1-14
(4th ed. 2013) (1988) (describing employer/employee relationship under the common law);
THEODORE B. CORNBLATT, ET AL., WORKERS COMPENSATION MANUAL 1 (14th ed.); MAURICE J.
PRESSMAN, WORK[ERS’] COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND 1 (2d ed. 1977); George E. Barnett, The
End of the Maryland Work[ers’] Compensation Act, 19 Q.J. ECON. 320 (1905); George E. Barnett,
Maryland Work[ers’] Compensation Act, 16 Q.J. ECON. 591 (1902); Russell B. James, Constitutionality of Compulsory Work[ers’] Compensation Statutes, 13 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1915).
123. And, in today’s environment, the deal looks even more lopsided as tort recoveries frequently far exceed workers’ compensation schedules, which don’t keep up with inflation.
124. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co. provides a paradigm. 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917).
While the case surely arose in the context of Mr. Solvuca’s workplace injury, the Court of Appeals
did not evaluate the fairness of the worker’s compensation scheme by reference just to his injury.
Instead, the Court evaluated the fairness of the alternative compensation to the whole class of injured
workers. Id. at 273–76, 101 A. at 713–14. That same year, the United States Supreme Court addressed a federal constitutional challenge to New York’s workers’ compensation statute. N.Y. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 192 (1917). In framing its analysis, the Court noted that “[t]he
statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish another system in its
place. . . . The act evidently is intended as a just settlement of a difficult problem . . . and it is to be
judged in its entirety.” Id. at 201–02.
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D. Moral Reasoning
Professor Ronald Dworkin advocates the explicit use of moral philosophy to interpret constitutional provisions.125 He advocates using a three-step
process:
1. The interpreter must decide whether the provision either
(1) states an abstract moral principle126 or (2) is more
specific and does not involve a moral principle.127 If the
provision is specific (Dworkin uses the example of Article II’s requirement that the President be at least thirtyfive years old), it is interpreted according to its terms.
On the other hand, if the provision states an abstract
moral principle, the interpreter then moves to step 2.
2. The interpreter must determine what moral principle the
framers intended to enact by adopting the provision.
Dworkin conducts this inquiry “by constructing different elaborations of the [abstract phrases the framers
used], each of which we can recognize as a principle of
political morality that might have won their respect, and
then by asking which of these it makes most sense to
attribute to them, given everything else we know.”128
3. “The moral reading [then] asks [constitutional interpreters] to find the best conception of constitutional moral
principles . . . that fits the broad story of America’s historical record.”129

Dworkin insists that this is not an open-ended invitation for judges to
read their policy preferences into the Constitution but is constrained by the
judge’s notion of integrity in interpreting the text—that judges must read the
moral clauses of the Constitution in a manner that is consistent both with “the
structural design of the Constitution as a whole” and also with “the dominant
lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges.”130
125. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2 (1996); see also Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4,
at 444–48 (discussing moral reasoning).
126. DWORKIN, supra note 125, at 7 (referring to the examples of “free speech,” “due process,”
and “equal protection” as abstract moral language subject to the moral reading).
127. Id. at 8. Dworkin cites Article II’s requirement that the President be at least thirty-five
years old and the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering soldiers in citizens’ homes in peacetime as examples of specific provisions that do not encompass moral principles. Id.
128. Id. at 9. For an example of this process of “elaboration,” see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE 381–87 (1986).
129. DWORKIN, supra note 125, at 11.
130. Id. at 10.
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With Dworkin’s three-step interpretive theory in mind, our task is next
to see if it can help us better understand Article 19. At the first step, there
can be little doubt that Article 19 belongs in the category of those provisions
that state an abstract moral principle. Read it again:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land,
and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
of the Land.131
Dworkin identifies “due process of law” as it appears in the federal constitution as a statement of an abstract moral principle; in fact, it is one of the
Constitution’s phrases to which Dworkin seeks to use moral reasoning to give
content.132 It seems obvious that if, as the Court of Appeals has said, the
phrase “Law of the Land” as it appears in Article 19 means “due process of
law,”133 then both phrases state abstract moral principles. Moreover, while I
was willing to disregard the second half of Article 19 in the textualist analysis
above, here it draws our attention. It is hard to imagine a more perfect example of a phrase stating an abstract moral principle than “justice and right.”
This allows us to move to Dworkin’s step two.
At step two, we are to engage in a process that Dworkin calls elaboration, in which we are to trying to identify statements of moral principles that
the framers might have been seeking in drafting Article 19. I have identified
two candidates:
1. That government should protect the rights of the aggrieved, the weak, and the injured; or
2. That government should provide prompt, neutral, regular, non-violent dispute resolution.
Both formulations of the abstract moral principle animating Article 19
seem plausible.134 We move next to Dworkin’s step three, in which he applies the moral principle to the current controversy.
Neither of my formulations of the abstract moral principle help resolve
the primary question of under what circumstances the legislature may modify
existing common law tort remedies. Nonetheless, they do provide insight.

131. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 19.
132. DWORKIN, supra note 125.
133. See supra note 52.
134. The careful reader will note that I have cheated in Dworkin’s step two by skipping the too
complicated question of the identity of the framers of Article 19 and trying to guess which abstract
moral principle each was trying to vindicate. Do we include King John and his feudal barons at
Runnymeade? King Henry III? Lord Coke? The members of the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1776? 1851? 1864? 1867? In the end, I skip this step because I simply don’t have any
additional information to inform my guess about which formulation of the abstract moral principle
any of the possible framers of Article 19 were trying to vindicate.
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My first formulation is plaintiff-centered: under this formulation, the government’s job is to protect victims. Thus, if the first formulation is the abstract
moral principle the framers intended, any legislative substitution must provide a sufficient, if not an equal, remedy to the remedy that existed at common law. On the other hand, my second formulation is process-centered: the
government’s job is to provide a fair, neutral process for dispute resolution.
If the second formulation is the abstract moral principle the framers intended,
that has important implications too. Under such a regime, the appropriate
question isn’t whether the plaintiff wins, but rather, whether the plaintiff has
a fair opportunity to present the case to a neutral decisionmaker.
While this might not always be the case, here the process of “elaboration” at Dworkin’s second step seems like it would be outcome-determinative, but ultimately is unknowable. The best we can say is that both of these
abstract moral principles should be kept in mind when deciding Article 19
cases.
E. Comparative Constitutional Law
While comparative constitutional law is an unfamiliar and controversial
technique for interpreting the federal Constitution,135 it is a well-established
and important method of interpreting state constitutions.136 The Maryland
Court of Appeals, however, has rarely looked beyond its own precedents in
interpreting Article 19 and did not do so in Jackson. This was a mistake.
Many other states have done far more extensive work in interpreting their
remedy provisions.
With thirty-nine state constitutions containing remedy clauses,137 a great
variety of judicial tests have developed by which courts evaluate legislative
modifications of common law tort remedies. Many commentators have created elaborate taxonomies by which to explain the range of judicial
choices.138 I won’t repeat their work here. It is sufficient for my purposes to
note that the continuum of possibilities includes:

135. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1340–44 (2007).
136. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 15–16 (2009); see
also Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 449–50 (applying comparative constitutional interpretation to state constitutional law).
137. See supra note 89.
138. FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6-6–6-11; Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a
Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2003); Shannon M. Roesler, Comment, The Kansas Remedy by
Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 655 (1999);
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra note 3; Janice Sue Wang, State Constitutional Remedy
Provisions and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility of Greater
Judicial Protection of Established Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64 WASH. L. REV. 203
(1989).
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The Montana Supreme Court, for example, reads Montana’s
remedy provision as directed to the judiciary, not the legislature,
and as a result, the Court defers completely to its legislature.
The Court will not invalidate a legislative modification of a
common law tort remedy.139
Many states, like Maryland before Jackson, employed a rational
basis test to evaluate remedy clause challenges. Thus, for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court will uphold a law
whose purpose is “to eliminate or curtail a clear social or economic problem, and the alteration or repeal of the existing cause
of action or remedy is a reasonable method of achieving such
purpose.”140
At the time that the Maryland Court of Appeals was deciding
Jackson, the Oregon Supreme Court was employing a “time
capsule” analysis to decide challenges to legislative modifications of tort remedies. Under this test, the Oregon Supreme
Court read Oregon’s remedy provision to preserve all common
law remedies as they existed at the time its constitution was
adopted but to allow legislative modification of common law
remedies that were enacted after the adoption of the constitution.141
In 2016, the Oregon Supreme Court overruled its prior precedent (described above) and adopted a new rule that permits a
substitution of tort remedies so long as the new remedy isn’t
“paltry”:

139. Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491–93 (Mont. 1989). Other states employ
the same deferential standard. See, e.g., Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. 1978)
(stating that the remedy provision is “a mandate to the judiciary and not . . . a limitation upon the
legislature”). But see Koch, supra note 77, at 448–451 (criticizing the approach of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1971) (stating that the remedy
provision is “clearly directed toward the preservation of procedural rights and has been so construed”); O’Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 493 P.2d 344, 346 (Colo. 1972) (stating that the
remedy provision does not prohibit legislature from changing a law that previously created a right,
“[r]ather, this section simply provides that if a right does accrue under the law, the courts will be
available to effectuate such right”).
140. Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 645 (W. Va. 1991); see also Haney
v. Int’l Harvester Co., 201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Minn. 1972); Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 557
N.W.2d 396, 404–05 (S.D. 1996); Tomczak v. Bailey, 578 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Wis. 1998).
141. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 353 (Or. 2001), overruled by Horton v.
Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 376 P.3d 998 (Or. 2016). For a critique of Smothers, see Hoffman, Questions Before Answers, supra note 67. Other decisions applying this “time capsule” approach include
Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 848 (Kan. 1989); Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 264–65
(Ky. 1998). See also Roesler, supra note 138, at 661; Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra note
3, at 1208–09. Interestingly, at the time it decided Jackson, the Maryland Court of Appeals was
already, theoretically, familiar with Oregon’s Smothers decision, having cited it with approval in
Dua. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 645 n.14, 805 A.2d 1061, 1085 n.14 (2002).
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[I]n deciding whether the legislature’s actions
impair a person’s right to a remedy . . . we must
consider the extent to which the legislature has
departed from the common-law model measured
against its reasons for doing so. . . . [T]he substantiality of the legislative remedy can matter in
determining whether the remedy is consistent
with the remedy clause. When the legislature
does not limit the duty that a defendant owes a
plaintiff but does limit the size or nature of the
remedy, the legislative remedy need not restore
all the damages that the plaintiff sustained to pass
constitutional muster, but a remedy that is only a
paltry fraction of the damages that the plaintiff
sustained will unlikely be sufficient.142
The Texas Supreme Court uses a balancing test. It holds:
[T]he right to bring a well-established common
law cause of action cannot be effectively abrogated by the legislature absent a showing that the
legislative basis for the statute outweighs the denial of the constitutionally-guaranteed right of
redress. In applying this test, we consider both
the general purpose of the statute and the extent
to which the litigant’s right to redress is affected. . . . [We] note that the litigant has two criteria to satisfy. First, it must be shown that the
litigant has a cognizable common law cause of
action that is being restricted. Second, the litigant must show that the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute.143
The Kansas Supreme Court uses a “quid-pro-quo” test, by
which the legislature may only eliminate or restrict a cause of
action if it supplies an adequate substitute remedy: “The legislature can modify the common law so long as it provides an adequate substitute remedy for the right infringed or abolished.”144

142. Horton, 376 P.3d at 1028 (citing Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or. 359, 376 (2013)).
143. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665–66 (Tex. 1983).
144. Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 263 (Kan. 1988); see also Bonin v.
Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 769 (Kan. 1996); Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1188 (Kan. 1991); Samsel
v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990). But see Roesler, supra note 138 at 662,
669 (arguing that Kansas’ quid-pro-quo approach has essentially been reduced to a rational basis
review). New Hampshire has also used the quid-pro-quo approach. Estabrook v. Am. Hoist &
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The Utah Supreme Court uses a two-part test, which includes
both a “quid-pro-quo component” and an explicit balancing test:
First, [the remedy clause] is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy “by due course of
law” for vindication of his constitutional interest.
The benefit provided by the substitute must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the
remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one’s person,
property, or reputation, although the form of the
substitute remedy may be different. . . . Second,
if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.145
 The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a three-stage rule, incorporating a “time capsule,” a “quid-pro-quo,” and a balancing
component:
[1] where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided [a]
by statutory law predating the adoption of the
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the
State of Florida, or [b] where such right has become a part of the common law of the State . . .
[2] the Legislature is without power to abolish
such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the
State to redress for injuries, [3] unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.146
Particularly in states where “tort reform” is frequently on the legislative
agenda, courts have sharpened their analyses over the years to develop rules
Derrick, Inc., 498 A.2d 741, 748 (N.H. 1985), overruled by Young v. Prevue Prods., Inc., 534 A.2d
714 (N.H. 1987); see also Light, supra note 103, at 358; Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, supra
note 3, at 1211–12.
145. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
146. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
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for increasingly complex situations.147 For present purposes, my point is not
to endorse any one of these tests (although I will later), but to point out that
a wide variety of excellent, battle-tested methods of analysis existed for the
Court of Appeals to have considered in Jackson, but the Court never looked
outside of Maryland’s borders. It is also worth noting in this context that had
the Jackson Court looked at our sister states, it would have seen a diversity
of levels of deference to the legislative choices, but it would have found no
examples of a court declining to give any deference at all. To repeat, the least
deferential example that existed would likely have been that of Florida, the
courts of which demand that legislative substitution of common law tort remedies satisfy strict scrutiny. Even Florida, however, is more deferential than
the test that the Jackson Court selected, which proceeds without reference to
the legislature whatsoever.148
F. Common Law Reasoning
Professor David Strauss of the University of Chicago Law School has
argued that the best method of explaining our system of constitutional interpretation is by analogy to the development of the common law.149 This theory
counsels an interpreter against novel theories of constitutional interpretation
but to accept “traditional” and “conventional” formulations that have been
“accepted over time” and were developed by “people who were acting reflectively and in good faith.”150 I have argued that the analysis that Professor
Strauss observes in constitutional interpretation is similar to the analysis that
courts use in deciding whether to follow their prior precedents because of
stare decisis.151
As described above, Jackson marked a sea change in the Court of Appeals’ Article 19 jurisprudence.152 Before Jackson, the Court evaluated legislative modifications to common law tort remedies with great deference, applying only rational basis review and never, in fact, rejecting such a
legislative modification.153 Jackson reversed the presumption, holding that

147. See FRIESEN, supra note 38, at 6-11–6-58.
148. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
149. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36 (2010) (noting that “the common law
approach provides a far better understanding of what our constitutional law actually is”); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing that the common law approach is most effective
at restraining judges); see also Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at
462–66 (applying common law constitutional interpretation to state constitutional law).
150. Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 149, at 890–91.
151. Friedman, Applying Federal Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 463–64 (comparing
common law constitutional interpretation to stare decisis).
152. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the Court would review a legislative modification of a tort remedy and determine itself whether the modification was “reasonable.” Under the test formulated by Jackson, only if the Court is satisfied will a legislative modification be affirmed.
It can be no surprise that I don’t think much fidelity is owed to the decision in Jackson. The test stated there is neither traditional nor conventional.
It is aberrant. And that aberration can and should be corrected.
III. A NEW TEST
To summarize, textualism cannot conclusively determine the meaning
of Article 19. It does remind us, however, to focus on tort victims. While
some believe that it is possible that better, more focused historical research
may yield a definitive originalist interpretation, I do not share that optimism.154 I don’t think we will ever determine the precise meaning of our
remedy provision through historical research. By contrast, I think structuralism provides important insights about the proper interpretation of Article 19.
Specifically, structuralism directs our attention to the separation of powers
and counsels us to adopt a standard that is respectful of both the legislative
and judicial branches of government, allows them to function within their
core competencies, and doesn’t assign either a superior position. Structuralism also reminds us not to repeat the errors of the past. Moral reasoning can
focus the interpreter on the abstract moral principle the constitutional Framers wanted to protect, but it doesn’t make a definitive selection of interpretation. Comparative constitutional law provides us with dozens of models from
which we can pick. Common law constitutional interpretation, if nothing
else, releases us from the stare decisis effect of the Jackson decision.
As a result of the lessons learned from the various methods of constitutional interpretation, I reject the positions that our sister states have taken that
are too deferential to the legislative branch (like Montana, West Virginia, and
Maryland before Jackson) or not sufficiently deferential (like Florida). I
don’t think that the “time capsule” approach that assigns a preferred position
to common law remedies that pre-date the adoption of the Constitution, offers
much to commend it (other than the alleged simplicity of its application). In
fact, the leading proponent of this approach, Oregon, has now abandoned it.
Having surveyed the alternatives and found, like Goldilocks, that one test is
too strict and one test is too deferential, I think the test that’s just right is that:
A legislative modification (or elimination) of a common law remedy (including immunities, damage caps, statutes of limitations
and repose, and alternative compensation systems) is constitutional
unless (1) it fails to provide an alternative remedy that is reasonable
to the class to which the victim belongs (including all persons
154. See supra note 96.
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harmed or who will be harmed by the defendant’s conduct (including the defendant(s) and other parties contributing to similar harm);
or (2) it is not reasonably related to an important state objective.155
This test, if not specifically mandated by the text and history of Article
19, is certainly not prohibited by them. It considers both the injured individual and the class of those harmed.156 This proposed test is respectful of both
the judiciary and the legislature, it doesn’t force either branch to defer completely to the other, and it assigns to each functions that are within their core
competencies. It will allow the legislature to predict what it must do to comply with its constitutional responsibilities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Jackson v. Dackman Co. established
a test for analysis of legislative modification of common law tort remedies
under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights that makes the test
solely whether the legislation is reasonable in the minds of a majority of the
Court of Appeals’ judges. A more careful look at Article 19 using the technique identified in my earlier work provides a better test that is more consistent with the text and history of the provision, comports with the separation
of powers, and is informed by the useful experimentation conducted by our
sister states.

155. I am not claiming that my proposal is particularly original. My proposal is substantively
similar to the test suggested by Judge Koch and contains elements of the Oregon and Utah approaches cited above. See Koch, supra note 77, at 450; supra notes 142 and 145 and accompanying
text.
156. In thinking about this test, I am in substantial debt to Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds & Andrew M. Murad, A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory
Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221 (2012). While I love the whole article,
the section on the importance of enforcing the boundaries of a no-fault system was particularly
helpful here. Id. at 255–57.

